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Abstract
Events that had to be predicted evoke large P3 components of the event-related EEG potential. There is conflicting
evidence whether these P3s are moderated by participants’ preceding guesses. In the present study, participants made
one prediction frequently and the other rarely because one stimulus was presented frequently and the other rarely.
Thereby, effects on stimulus-evoked P3s of both guess frequency and stimulus frequency could be tested. Indeed, P3s
were not only larger with rare than frequent stimuli but also larger after rare than frequent guesses. This result pattern
may have additionally been affected by expectancies for payoff. In any case, the modification of outcome-evoked P3
by what had been guessed may reflect that each of the four guess-stimulus combinations is encoded as a separate event
category. In terms of the stimulus-response link hypothesis of P3b, it is suggested that P3s are evoked by these events
because internal responses (right or wrong) are associated to each of these event categories and need to be reactivated
with rare guess-stimulus combinations.
Descriptors: P300, Feedback, Guessing, P3b
The P3 component of ERPs was first reported in a prediction task
(Sutton, Braren, Zubin, & John, 1965). Two stimuli (flashes and
clicks) were presented in random order. When participants had to
predict which stimulus would appear, occurrence of the stimuli
evoked a large slow positive potential, soon afterwards termed P3
(Ritter, Vaughan, & Costa, 1968, referring to Davis, Mast, Yoshie,
& Zerlin, 1966) or P300 (Donchin & Cohen, 1969). From the very
outset, a question of interest was whether this outcome-evoked P3
contains information about participants’ preceding guess. Sutton
et al. (1965) had already studied whether P3 differs between incor-
rectly and correctly predicted stimuli and obtained larger ampli-
tudes after incorrect predictions. However, the opposite result,
larger P3 amplitudes after correct than after incorrect predictions,
was obtained by Levit, Sutton, and Zubin (1973), and no difference
was obtained in other studies (Kotchoubey, Gr€ozinger, Kornhuber,
& Kornhuber, 1997; Verleger & Cohen, 1978).
A similar diversity of results has been obtained in gambling
tasks where participants had to select one of several visible stimuli
(symbolized, e.g., in the Iowa Gambling Task as covert decks of
cards; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994) in order to
gain or lose some amount of money. The P3 evoked by revealing
the value assigned to the chosen stimulus was sometimes larger for
losses than wins (Hajcak, Holroyd, Moser, & Simons, 2005; Haj-
cak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons, 2007), frequently larger for wins
than losses (Bellebaum, Polezzi, & Daum, 2010; Bismark, Hajcak,
Whitworth, & Allen, 2013; Gentsch, Grandjean, & Scherer, 2013;
Kimura & Katayama, 2013, as a tendency; Wu & Zhou, 2009;
Yang, Guo, Tang, & Luo, 2013), and sometimes did not differ
(Goyer, Woldorff, & Huettel, 2008; Yeung & Sanfey, 2004). Thus,
as already conjectured by Sutton et al. (1965, p.150), it appears that
success or failure of guessing per se does not affect P3. Rather, this
effect might interact with other factors, including stimulus proba-
bilities, payoff structure, physical differences between stimuli, and
sequence of preceding stimuli (cf. Munson, Ruchkin, Ritter, Sutton,
& Squires, 1984).
When two stimuli are presented in unpredictable random series,
one stimulus frequently and the other rarely, then the rarely occur-
ring stimuli will evoke larger P3 amplitudes than the frequent ones
(oddball effect; Duncan-Johnson & Donchin, 1977; Squires,
Squires, & Hillyard, 1975). In the present study, the two stimuli to
be guessed differed in their probabilities (80% vs. 20% of trials).
Participants were informed about the frequency relation by both
oral and written instructions. Therefore, their guesses are expected
to reflect these probabilities: Ideally, frequent guesses will occur in
80% of trials and rare guesses in 20%. This yields expected proba-
bilities of 0.80 3 0.80 5 64% for the f! F combination (guess the
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frequent outcome, outcome is indeed the frequent one), 0.20 3
0.80 5 16% for r ! F (guess rare, but outcome is frequent), 0.80
3 0.20 5 16% for f ! R, and 0.20 3 0.20 5 4% for r ! R. This
distribution of events provides an opportunity to test whether
outcome-evoked P3s contain traces of participants’ preceding
guesses, because there are not only frequent and rare stimuli but,
independently, frequent and rare guesses. The question is whether
rare guesses will lead to increased amplitudes of P3s evoked by the
guessed outcomes. This question was already pursued by Tueting,
Sutton, and Zubin (1970) who indeed found that P3 increased with
decreasing frequencies both of outcomes and of guesses. But data
were reported from four participants only and recordings were
made from frontocentral sites only, thereby possibly missing the
bulk of the P3 complex, which, in active tasks, consists of a small
frontocentral P3a and a large centroparietally focused P3b (Deb-
ener, Makeig, Delorme, & Engel, 2005; Dien, Spencer, & Donchin,
2004; Gaeta, Friedman, & Hunt, 2003; Verleger, Jaskowski, &
Wascher, 2005).
Therefore, this question was addressed anew in the present
study, stating the following hypotheses. Undoubtedly, due to the
oddball effect, outcome-evoked P3 will be affected by the 80/20
stimulus probability: rare stimuli will evoke larger P3 amplitudes
than frequent stimuli (R> F). This will be the only effect if guess
frequency is not reflected in the P3 evoked by guessed events. In
contrast, we assume that also rare guesses will lead to larger
outcome-evoked P3 amplitudes than frequent guesses (r> f),
thereby causing the outcome-evoked P3 to contain information
about the preceding prediction. Combining this presumed effect of
prediction with the uncontroversial effect of stimulus probability:
P3 is expected to be largest for r! R, smaller for r! F and f!
R, and smallest for f ! F, reflecting the inverse frequencies of
these guess-outcome combinations (4%, 16%, 16%, 64%). This
combination implies opposite effects of guessing correctly for fre-
quent and rare stimuli: P3 amplitudes will be larger for incorrectly
than correctly guessed frequent stimuli (r ! F> f ! F, because
16% is less frequent than 64%) but smaller for incorrectly than cor-
rectly guessed rare stimuli (f! R< r ! R, because 16% is more
frequent than 4%).
There is the risk that participants would not truly guess but
rather press any key, to pass through the task as quickly as possible.
Moreover, even if participants are cooperative enough to play the
guessing game without any external reward, guided by internal
motivation, then, if this internal reinforcement is provided by
guessing correctly as much as possible, the optimum strategy con-
sists of always guessing the frequent event. Therefore, to achieve
the desired 80/20 distribution of guesses, corresponding to the 80/
20 distribution of stimuli, we assigned payoffs to rare and frequent
stimuli that are inversely proportional to their probabilities. Payoffs
of 12 cents (ct.) were assigned for correctly guessed frequent
events, of 18 ct. for correctly guessed rare events, and of 0 ct. for
incorrect guesses. Thereby, making the frequent guess became as
rational as making the rare guess: The expected payoff is equal
(80% * 2 ct. 5 20% * 8 ct.) and nothing would be lost in case of
incorrect predictions. Thus, we hoped to obtain frequent and rare
guesses in a ratio of 80/20 corresponding to their objective proba-
bilities. Whether the intended effects of guess probability were
moderated by unintended effects of payoff value will be addressed
in the General Discussion section.
Effects of the preceding guess on the outcome-evoked P3 might
be mediated by processes reflected by electrophysiological events
measurable between guessing and outcome. Because outcome-
evoked P3 is measured against a baseline before outcome onset,
any increase of outcome-evoked P3 after rare guesses might
actually be due to increased levels of negativity of this prestimulus
baseline after such rare guesses. To control for this possibility, the
stimulus-preceding negativity (SPN) was measured, which devel-
oped in the 1-s interval between guessing and outcome onset (cf.
Kotchoubey et al., 1994).
In order to distinguish effects of guessing more clearly from the
act of simply pressing a key, the mapping of guesses to the two
keys was varied in Experiment 1. In fixed blocks, key assignments
were constant, for example, pressing left always meant guessing
the letter X, and pressing right meant guessing the letter U. In alter-
nating blocks, assignments were alternating between trials. Experi-
ment 2 served as control experiment to corroborate the major result
of Experiment 1.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 aimed at studying effects of making frequent or rare
guesses on P3 amplitudes evoked by the guessed stimuli. We
expected that making the rare guess would be reflected in larger
P3s evoked by the outcomes, independently of outcome
probabilities.
To control for the possibility that participants mechanically
pressed some key instead of guessing, how guesses were mapped
to the two keys was varied. In fixed blocks, key assignments were
constant across trials. In alternating blocks, assignments were alter-
nating between trials.
Method
Participants. Sixteen right-handed university students participated
(8 females and 8 males, aged 24 years on average, SD 5 2.2). All
participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no
history of neurological disorders. Informed written consent was
obtained before the experiment, and participants were paid depend-
ing on their success in guessing, amounting to 15e–17e, paid out
after the experiment. (See below for details).
Stimuli and procedure. Participants were seated in a comfortable
armchair in a darkened room, with about 1.1 m viewing distance
from the 17" computer screen, and held a computer keyboard on
their lap. They were informed by written instruction on the screen
that the task was a gambling game requiring some luck, that they
had to guess which of the two letters X or U would occur, and that
one letter would occur frequently and the other rarely. Accurate
guesses would yield 2 ct. for frequent letters and 8 ct. for rare let-
ters, and no money would be lost after inaccurate guesses. The task
consisted of 1,000 trials, divided into four blocks. After every 20
trials and at block ending, summary feedback was given, separately
for frequent and rare outcomes, on the number of correct guesses
and the amount of money earned. Presentation software 14.0
(www.neurobs.com) was used to present the stimuli, register
responses, and send stimulus and response codes to another com-
puter, where codes were stored with the recorded EEG.
As illustrated in Figure 1, trials started with a guess prompt
below screen center (“guess, please” in German, in 20 pt. font) dis-
playing the two letters left and right below the prompt, as a
reminder about which key, left or right, was assigned to which let-
ter. These texts were black on a light gray screen. Participants
made their guess by pressing the left or right Ctrl keys on the key-
board. To prevent premature mechanistic guessing, error messages
(“pressed too early,” in German) appeared in large red 30-pt. font
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for 4 s whenever the keys were pressed before onset of the guess
prompt. Key pressing blanked the screen and was followed after
1 s by the outcome, which was an X or U (Helvetica, 35 pt.) dis-
played at screen center for 200 ms. X was the frequent letter for
half the participants, and U for the other half. The outcome letter
was displayed in color, providing explicit feedback about guess
accuracy. For half the participants, blue meant positive feedback
and yellow meant negative feedback, and vice versa for the other
half (crossed with assigned frequencies of X vs. U). The guess
prompt of the next trial was presented 1 s later.
The mode of assigning keys to stimuli was varied between
blocks. Within the two “fixed” blocks, assignment remained con-
stant: In one block, X was guessed by pressing left and U by pressing
right, and vice versa in the other block. In the two “alternating”
blocks, assignment alternated with each trial. Four different block
orders were used across participants (crossed with the above balanc-
ing of letter frequency and color meaning): Fixed blocks were either
blocks #1 and #3, or #2 and #4, and of these two fixed blocks, either
the left-frequent or the right-frequent block was presented first.
The letter to be presented was randomly chosen in each trial
with 80/20 probabilities. An additional restriction against immedi-
ate repetitions of two rare letters was introduced. In this case, the
frequent letter was presented instead of the repeated rare letter,
which was deferred to the following trial (where its probability
was, thereby, 0.2 1 0.2 – 0.2*0.2 5 36%). This restriction dimin-
ished the global probability of rare letters from 20% to 19.2%.
Analysis of behavior and of outcome percentages. Analyses of
variance (ANOVAs) on repeated measurements were used for
statistical analyses. The major behavioral measure was given by
the frequencies of the four guess-outcome combinations, which
resulted from the objective probabilities of events and from partici-
pants’ guessing behavior. To analyze outcome frequencies, percen-
tages of correctly and incorrectly guessed frequent and rare events
were determined in either experimental condition (fixed vs. alter-
nating key mapping) and were analyzed in an ANOVA with the
factors outcome (f! F, r! F, f! R, r! R) and key assignment
(fixed vs. alternating) and in ensuing pairwise comparisons
between outcomes. Percentages of guessing the rare events were
compared to actual percentages in an ANOVA with the factors sub-
jective/objective (guessing vs. actual frequency) and key assign-
ment (as before).
Additionally, the speed of guessing was measured, by response
times (RTs) of pressing the keys (for guessing) in response to the
guess prompt. Averaged RTs were entered to an ANOVA with the
factors frequency of guessed event (frequent vs. rare) and key
assignment (fixed vs. alternating).
EEG recording and analysis. EEG was recorded with Ag/AgCl
electrodes (Easycap, www.easycap.de) from 60 scalp sites, includ-
ing 8 midline positions from AFz to Oz and 26 pairs of symmetric
left and right sites. Additional electrodes were placed at the nose
tip for offline reference and at Fpz as connection to ground. Online
reference was Fz. For artifact control, electrooculogram (EOG)
was recorded, vertically (vEOG) from above versus below the right
eye and horizontally (hEOG) from positions next to the left and
right tails of the eyes. Data were amplified from DC to 250 Hz by a
BrainAmp MR plus and stored at 500 Hz per channel. Offline
Figure 1. Outline of the paradigm. The guess prompt informed about mapping of the two stimuli to keys (here, X left, U right), which was fixed
within a block or (in Experiment 1) alternated between trials. Outcomes appeared 1 s after guessing. In Experiment 1 and in the explicit condition of
Experiment 2, blue or yellow denoted right or wrong (here, black and gray). One stimulus was frequent (X), the other rare (U), schematically 80%/
20% (in Experiment 1 actually 81%/19%). This proportion was expected to be reflected in participants’ guess probabilities, 80%/20%. If so, the four
outcomes had probabilities of 64%, 16%, 16%, and 4%.
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processing was done with BrainVision Analyzer software (version
2.03). Data were rereferenced to the nose tip, low-pass filtered at
25 Hz, and segmented to epochs of 2.1 s duration, from 100 ms
before the guess key press to 1 s after outcome onset. These epochs
were edited for artifacts. First, epochs were rejected as gross arti-
facts when consecutive data points differed by more than 50 mV
(except EOG and AF3, AFz, AF4, lest trials would be rejected for
blinks). Then, ocular artifacts were corrected by using the linear
regression method implemented in the BrainAnalyzer software.
Finally, data were referred to the mean amplitude of the first 100
ms before outcome onset (i.e., the 900–1,000 ms interval after the
guess response) as baseline in each channel, and trials were
rejected when voltages exceeded 6 150 mV in any EEG channel.
Mean numbers of remaining trials included for analysis were, for
fixed and alternating mapping, respectively, 291 and 286 for the f
! F combination (minima: 242 and 191), 90 and 96 for r ! F
(minima: 40 and 49), 62 and 64 for f ! R (minima: 45 and 45),
and 26 and 26 for r! R (minima: 9 and 13).
EEG data were then averaged over trials, separately for the four
guess-outcome combinations in the two key-assignment conditions.
Parameters were measured in these averaged waveforms. After
inspecting these waveforms and their topographic distributions, the
latency window for searching the P3 peak was defined as 250–650
ms after letter onset at the seven midline sites, Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz,
Pz, POz, Oz. P3 amplitudes were found to be largest at FCz, Cz,
CPz, Pz in a first analysis on all seven midline sites. The main anal-
ysis, therefore, used data from those four sites, with the factors
recording site (4 levels), stimulus frequency (frequent, rare), guess
frequency (frequent, rare), and key assignment (fixed, alternating).
Amplitudes of SPN developing in the 1 s between guess and out-
come onset were measured as the level of ERPs at 100–0 ms before
outcome onset (serving as the baseline for P3 measurement),
referred to the level of activity 1 s before (at 100–0 ms before the
guess key press). These measurements were taken in averages
pooled across frequent and rare events because frequencies of these
events could not affect the preceding SPN. SPN amplitudes at the
seven midline sites were submitted to ANOVA with the factors
recording site (7 levels), guess frequency, and key assignment (as
above). A second ANOVA was conducted on the PO3, POz, and
PO4 sites where SPN was largest, using the same factors (with 3
levels for the recording site factor).
Degrees of freedom of the recording site factor were corrected
with the Greenhouse-Geisser method. To clarify interactions,
ANOVAs were conducted on the single levels of the interacting fac-
tors. Pearson correlations between frequencies and P3 amplitudes
were calculated across participants on the differences f! F minus r
! F, r! F minus f! R, and f! R minus r! R, in order to mea-
sure whether individual variations in P3 increase were related to
individual variations in frequencies of guess-outcome combinations.
Results
Behavior. The top panel of Figure 2 presents the frequencies of
the four outcomes under the two key assignments (fixed vs. alter-
nating). These frequencies amounted to 62%, 14%, 19%, and 5%
for f ! F, f ! R, r ! F, r ! R, respectively, pooled across key
assignments. These frequencies differed from each other globally,
F(3,45) 5 275.6, p< .001, and in ensuing pairwise analyses,
p 5 .02 for r ! F vs. f ! R, and p .001 for all other compari-
sons. Thus, frequent stimuli were more often guessed correctly
than incorrectly (62% vs. 19%) whereas rare stimuli were more
often guessed incorrectly than correctly (14% vs. 5%). Frequencies
did not differ between fixed and alternating key assignments, Out-
come 3 Key Assignment, F(3,45) 5 2.1, p 5 .14.
Proportions of frequent and rare events as randomly generated
by the control program amounted to 80.9% (f! F and r! F) and
19.1% (r ! R and f ! R; averages across participants, 6 1.1%)
which comes close to the expected probabilities of 80.8% and
19.2% (cf. Method). Proportions of participants’ guesses of fre-
quent and rare outcomes amounted to 75.3% (f ! F and f ! R)
and 24.7% (r ! F and r ! R; 6 8.9%). That is, rare events were
predicted more frequently (and, correspondingly, frequent events
less frequently) than they occurred, F(1,15) 5 6.3, p 5 .02. Accord-
ingly, frequent events were successfully predicted in 76.2% (6
8.7%) of their occurrences, f! F/(f! F 1 r! F), somewhat less
than their probabilities, and rare events were successfully predicted
in 28.1% (6 10.8%) of their occurrences, r! R/(r! R 1 f! R),
somewhat more than their probabilities.
Participants differed in overall frequencies of rare guesses
(varying from 12% to 42%) but, rather than being random, this
Figure 2. Mean frequencies (in %) for each guess-outcome combina-
tion. f and r on x axis denote frequent and rare guesses, F and R denote
frequent and rare outcomes. Open and filled bars represent the fixed and
alternate key assignment conditions of Experiment 1 (upper), and the
explicit and implicit feedback on guess correctness of Experiment 2
(lower). (Open-bar conditions remained equal across the two experi-
ments). The order of conditions from left to right is the same as in Fig-
ure 1.
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variability reflected quite stable individual response strategies, cor-
relating across participants between fixed and alternating key
assignments (r 5 .93, p< .001).
Participants needed more time for making their guess in
response to the guess prompt in the alternating-key than in the
fixed-key condition (717 ms vs. 565 ms; F(1,15) 5 25.1, p< .001)
and guessing rare tended to take longer than guessing frequent
when keys alternated (Key Assignment 3 Frequency of Guessed
Event: F(1,15) 5 6.5, p 5 .02; effect of frequency for alternating
keys: F(1,15) 5 3.1, p 5 .10) but not when keys were fixed (effect
of frequency for fixed keys: F(1,15) 5 0.0, n.s.).
ERPs. SPN before onset of outcome events. Figure 3 depicts
the time course of ERPs from the moment of the guess until 1 s
after outcome onset. Evidently, there is a distinct negative-going
stimulus-preceding potential between guessing and outcome onset.
This SPN was largest at the back of the head (Pz and POz in mid-
line analysis, main effect of recording site F(6,90) 5 12.3,
p< .001) and larger at lateral sites, in particular PO3 and PO4, than
at midline (recording site in the ANOVA on PO3, POz, PO4:
F(2,30) 5 4.7, p 5 .03). In the present context, the major result is
that SPN did not differ significantly after frequent and rare guesses
(guess frequency in midline analysis: F(1,15) 5 0.3, n.s.; Guess
Frequency 3 Recording Site: F(1,15) 5 1.2, n.s), in stark contrast
to outcome-evoked P3 (see below). There was a triple interaction
of Guess Frequency 3 Recording Site 3 Key Assignment, though,
F(6,90) 5 4.0, p 5 .02, reflecting effects of Key Assignment 3
Guess Frequency at Fz and FCz (at either site F(1,15) 5 6.5,
p 5 .02) because least negative values were reached at these sites
when rare guesses were made under fixed key assignment. The
only other effect was an interaction of Recording Site 3 Key
Assignment, F(6,90) 5 2.7, p 5 .046, because SPNs had their mid-
line maximum slightly less posteriorly (Pz and POz) with alternat-
ing assignment than with fixed assignment (POz and Oz). But
amplitudes did not differ between key assignments at any of these
midline sites (p 5 .08 at best).
P3 amplitude. Already Figure 3 shows that P3s evoked by the
guessed stimuli were larger after rare than frequent guesses. Figure
4 focuses on these stimulus-evoked ERPs, breaking frequent and
rare predictions (thin and bold lines, respectively, both in Figure 3
and Figure 4) further down to frequent and rare outcomes (gray
and black lines, respectively).
P3 amplitudes were analyzed from the midline sites FCz, Cz,
CPz, Pz where P3 was largest (cf. maps in Figure 4). Mean values
are compiled in Figure 5. P3 amplitudes were affected not only by
stimulus frequency, F(1,15) 5 98.3, p< .001, with larger ampli-
tudes for rare than frequent stimuli (black vs. gray in Figure 4) but,
unlike the preceding SPN, as well by guess frequency,
F(1,15) 5 30.1, p< .001, with larger amplitudes after rare than fre-
quent guesses (bold vs. thin in Figure 4). The interaction of these
two factors, F(1,15) 5 8.8, p 5 .01, indicated that effects of preced-
ing guesses were larger for frequent than for rare stimuli (effect of
guess frequency in separate analysis of frequent stimuli:
F(1,15) 5 45.2, p< .001; for rare stimuli: F(1,15) 5 8.8, p 5 .009).
Overall, amplitudes were larger at CPz and Cz than at Pz and FCz,
F(3,45) 5 5.7, p 5 .02. This effect of site interacted with stimulus
frequency, F(3,45) 5 6.9, p 5 .01, because amplitude maxima
shifted from a more posterior focus with the smaller P3 evoked by
frequent stimuli (CPz and Pz) towards a more anterior focus with
the larger P3 evoked by rare stimuli (Cz and CPz).
Key assignment interacted with Stimulus Frequency 3 Guess
Frequency, F(1,15) 5 7.0, p 5 .02, because P3 tended to be larger
with alternating than fixed assignment with frequent stimuli (effect
of key assignment in separate analysis of frequent stimuli:
F(1,15) 5 3.8, p 5 .07) and had the same tendency with rare stimuli
after rare guesses but the opposite tendency with rare stimuli after
frequent guesses (effect of Key Assignment 3 Guess Frequency
for rare stimuli: F(1,15) 5 6.4, p 5 .02). Furthermore, key
Figure 3. Pz waveforms and scalp topographies of SPN for frequent and rare guesses in Experiment 1. Data have been pooled across frequent and
rare outcomes. Waveforms are displayed for frequent and rare guesses (thin vs. bold lines) with fixed-key versus alternating-key assignment (solid vs.
dashed lines). Unit of x axis is ms, with the zero point denoting outcome onset. Unit of y axis is mV, with negative polarity plotted upwards. The
maps display scalp topographies at 100 ms before outcome onset (epoch depicted by gray rectangle). View on the head is from above. Each map is
scaled from negative maximum (black) to zero (white).
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assignment tended to interact with Stimulus Frequency 3 Site,
F(3,45) 5 3.0, p 5 .06, because with rare stimuli P3 was equally
large at Cz and CPz with alternating mapping and somewhat larger
at Cz than CPz with fixed mapping.
Correlations between outcome frequencies and P3 ampli-
tudes. To confirm the inverse relationship between P3 amplitudes
and event frequencies also in terms of between-subject variations,
correlations were computed across participants between decreases
in event frequencies and the corresponding increases in P3 ampli-
tudes at CPz, pooled across fixed and alternating key assignments.
Indeed, decreases of frequencies correlated with P3 increases (one-
sided p values): from f! F to r! F r(14) 5 -.56, p 5 .01; from r
! F to f! R r(14) 5 -.50, p 5 .02; from f! R to r! R r(14) 5 -
.42, p 5 .06.
Discussion
P3 amplitudes evoked by guessed stimuli were not only affected by
stimulus frequencies but as well by frequencies of the preceding
guesses. This is in line with the hypothesis that P3 evoked by out-
come stimuli contains information about participants’ preceding
guesses.
Key assignment was found to be of minor importance: Results
were highly similar with fixed and alternating key assignments,
and participants’ proportions of guessing the rare stimuli correlated
almost perfectly between these two assignment modes. This is
good evidence that participants did not mechanically press the keys
instead of guessing.
Also of minor importance were RTs of pressing the keys for
making the guess in response to the guess prompt: Effects on P3
amplitudes were very similar when keys were fixed and when keys
alternated, whereas RTs were generally larger when keys alter-
nated. Further, increases of P3 amplitudes after rare compared to
frequent guesses were similar for fixed and alternating conditions,
while RTs of rare and frequent guesses tended to differ from each
other only when keys alternated but not when assignment was
fixed.
Finally, the effect of frequencies of guesses on outcome-evoked
P3 amplitudes was not moderated by parallel effects on the SPN
developing between guesses and stimulus onsets. Rather, effects of
guess frequency on the SPN were restricted to rare guesses under
fixed key assignment. The topography of this effect, at anterior
sites near the hand-motor areas, suggests that this effect is related
to the fact that the hand making the rare guess is used less fre-
quently during the fixed key-assignment block (while both hands
are used equally often with alternating key assignment). Apart
from this possible motor contribution, similar to the contingent
negative variation (CNV) preceding an imperative signal that
requires a motor response (Walter, Cooper, Aldridge, McCallum,
& Winter, 1964), SPN had its topographical focus at posterior-
lateral sites PO3 and PO4. Any rigorous evaluation of SPN’s
topography must take into account that its baseline (100 ms before
the guess) is probably not electrically neutral (Urbach & Kutas,
2006) but may rather be affected by potentials evoked by the guess
prompt, presented 500–700 ms before participants made their guess
(cf. analysis of RTs). This said, such posterior-lateral topography,
near the visual cortices, does make some sense for this SPN
because no hand-motor action was being prepared (underlying the
usual frontocentral topography of CNV) but rather a visual stimu-
lus (the guessed outcome) was being expected (cf. Simons, €Ohman,
& Lang, 1979).
However, before drawing the strong conclusion that P3 evoked
by outcome stimuli contains information about participants’ pre-
ceding guesses, an obvious objection must be considered. In fact,
the very outcome stimuli differed depending on the preceding
guess: As indicated by the black and gray shades of letters in Fig-
ure 1, correctly and incorrectly guessed stimuli had different colors
(blue vs. yellow). We had done so as a further safeguard against
participants’ mechanically pressing some key and not being
Figure 4. CPz waveforms and scalp topographies of P3 for each guess-outcome combination in Experiment 1. Waveforms are displayed in each of
the four combinations: f ! F (thin gray), r ! F (bold gray), f ! R (thin black), and r ! R (bold black), separately for fixed (solid) and alternating
(dotted) mapping of guesses to keys. Unit of x axis is ms, with the zero point denoting outcome onset. Unit of y axis is mV, with negative polarity
plotted upwards. The maps display scalp topographies at the time points of the P3 peaks (340 ms, 390 ms, 400 ms, 350 ms for f ! F, r ! F, f ! R,
r ! R, respectively, pooled across the two key assignment conditions). View on the head is from above. Each map is scaled from minimum (black)
to maximum (white).
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interested in guess outcomes. Other parts of this motivation pack-
age were the money reward for gains and the feedback screens after
every 20 trials. But this tainting of letters depending on success
implied that, rather than reflecting information about participants’
preceding guesses, the increase of P3 after rare guesses in the pres-
ent task might have simply reflected differences between the evok-
ing outcome stimuli.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 tested whether the dependency of P3 amplitudes on
frequency of the preceding guess was indeed due to participants’
integrating the guessed stimuli with their preceding guesses or
whether this dependency was only obtained because letter colors
differed between correctly and incorrectly guessed stimuli. This
explicit cueing of prediction success was now used in one part of
Experiment 2 only. Crucially, in the other part, letters were uni-
formly black such that information about correctness of predictions
was only implicitly provided by the outcome stimuli, requiring par-
ticipants to compare stimuli to preceding predictions in order to
know whether predictions were correct.
Second, we wanted to make sure that results of Experiment 1
had not been biased by the restriction on randomness. Therefore,
this restriction was removed, thereby allowing rare stimuli to fol-
low each other, which yielded expected probabilities of exactly
80% and 20% for frequent and rare stimuli.
Method
Differences from Experiment 1 will be described only.
Participants. Sixteen right-handed undergraduate students partici-
pated (9 females and 7 males, aged 24 years on average, SD 5 3.1).
One other participant had to be replaced because he did not play
the guessing game according to our instructions but rather kept on
pressing the rare-guess key (perfectly rationally) in about 75% of
trials.
Stimuli and procedure. Two of the four blocks were identical to
the fixed-key blocks of Experiment 1. This will be called the
explicit part because letter color provided explicit information
about whether the guess was correct. In the implicit part, letters
were always black. Thereby, participants had to relate the letter to
their preceding guess in order to know whether their guess was cor-
rect. Either part consisted of two blocks with fixed key assignment,
where either the right or the left hand made the frequent guess and
the other hand the rare guess. Half the participants had the explicit
part first and half the implicit part. Within either part, half the par-
ticipants had the frequent guess first at the right key and half at the
left key.
There was no restriction against immediate repetitions of two
rare letters any more. Thus, the probabilities for frequent/rare stim-
uli were exactly 80/20.
Data analysis. Mean numbers of trials available for EEG analysis
after editing for artifacts were, for explicit and implicit feedback,
respectively, 282 and 269 for the f! F combination (minima: 205
and 129), 95 and 99 for r! F (minima: 47 and 59), 70 and 66 for f
! R (minima: 41 and 37), and 24 and 25 for r ! R (minima: 14
and 15).
In the ANOVAs, the key assignment factor was replaced by the
feedback type factor (explicit, implicit).
Results
Behavior. Frequencies of the four outcomes under the two feed-
back conditions are presented in the bottom panel of Figure 2.
There was no difference between explicit and implicit feedback,
Outcome 3 Feedback Type F(3,45) 5 1.1, n.s. Pooled across feed-
back types, frequencies amounted to 59%, 15%, 21%, and 5% for f
! F, f ! R, r ! F, r ! R, respectively. These frequencies dif-
fered from each other globally, F(3,45) 5 374.5, p< .001, and in
ensuing pairwise analyses, p 5 .006 for r ! F versus f ! R, and
p< .001 for all other comparisons.
As intended, proportions of frequent and rare stimuli, randomly
generated by the control program, amounted to 80.0% (f! F and r
! F) and 20.0% (r! R and f ! R; averages across participants,
61.1%). Proportions of participants’ guesses of frequent and rare
stimuli amounted to 74.0% (f! F and f! R) and 26.0% (r! F
and r! R; 6 7.2%). Thus, like in Experiment 1, rare stimuli were
predicted more frequently (and, correspondingly, frequent stimuli
less frequently) than they occurred, F(1,15) 5 10.3, p 5 .006.
Accordingly, frequent stimuli were successfully predicted in 74.1%
Figure 5. Mean amplitudes (in mV) of the P3 peak for each guess-
outcome combination. On x axis, f and r denote frequent and rare
guesses, F and R denote frequent and rare outcomes. Solid and dashed
lines represent fixed and alternate key assignment conditions of Experi-
ment 1 (upper), and explicit and implicit feedback on guess correctness
in Experiment 2 (lower). (Solid-line conditions remained equal across
the two experiments). y axis is inverted, with positive downwards, to
resemble polarity conventions of Figures 3, 4, 6, 7.
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(6 7.2%) of their occurrences, f! F/(f! F 1 r! F), somewhat
less than their probabilities, and rare stimuli were successfully pre-
dicted in 26.2% (6 7.8%) of their occurrences, r ! R/(r! R 1 f
! R), somewhat more than their probabilities.
Participants differed in their overall frequencies of rare guesses
(varying from 16% to 45%), which, again, reflected quite stable
individual response strategies, correlating across participants
between explicit and implicit feedback blocks (r 5 .73, p 5 .001).
Times for making the guess in response to the guess prompt
varied around 600 ms and remained unaffected from feedback type
and guess frequency, F(1,15) 0.9, n.s.
ERPs.
SPN before onset of outcome events. Figure 6 depicts the time
course of ERPs from the guessing key press until 1 s after outcome
onset. Like in Experiment 1, SPN was largest at the back of the
head (POz in midline analysis), main effect of recording site
F(6,90) 5 13.1, p< .001). Neither guess frequency (F 1.7,
p .21) nor feedback type (F 1.4, p .23) had significant
effects. SPN amplitudes were numerically larger at lateral sites
PO3 and PO4 than at POz but this difference was not significant,
unlike in Experiment 1 (recording site: F(2,30) 5 2.1, p 5 .14) nor
were there other significant effects in this analysis on PO sites
(F 2.5, p .12).
P3 amplitudes. Grand-average ERP waveforms evoked by the
outcomes are shown in Figure 7, and mean amplitudes are com-
piled in the lower panel of Figure 5.
Very similar to Experiment 1, P3 amplitudes were affected both
by stimulus frequency, F(1,15) 5 123.1, p< .001, with larger ampli-
tudes for rare than frequent stimuli (black vs. gray in Figure 7), and
by guess frequency, F(1,15) 5 23.7, p< .001, with larger amplitudes
after rare than frequent guesses (bold vs. thin in Figure 7). These two
factors interacted, F(1,15) 5 8.9, p 5 .009, indicating that large
effects of guesses occurred for frequent stimuli, F(1,15) 5 43.8,
p< .001, for the main effect of guess frequency in separate analysis
of frequent stimuli, but not for rare ones, F(1,15) 5 1.8, n.s., in sepa-
rate analysis of rare stimuli. Overall, amplitudes were largest at CPz
and smallest at FCz, F(3,45) 5 5.5, p 5 .02, without interaction with
any other factor, F(3,45) 1.7, p 0.21.
Importantly, feedback type did not modify effects of guess fre-
quency, all interactive effects of this combination of factors
F 1.1, p .36. The one effect of the feedback factor was its inter-
action with stimulus frequency, F(1,15) 5 7.2, p 5 .02, reflecting
that P3 tended to be smaller with implicit than explicit feedback for
frequent stimuli, F(1,15) 5 3.2, p 5 .10, but not for rare stimuli,
F(1,15) 5 1.1, n.s.
Correlations between outcome frequencies and P3
amplitudes. Correlations across participants between decreases in
event frequency and the corresponding increases in P3 amplitude at
CPz, pooled across explicit and implicit feedback, were significant
for the difference between f ! F and r ! F, r(14) 5 -.55, p 5 .01
(one-sided), but not between r! F and f! R, r(14) 5 -.22, n.s., nor
between f! R and r! R, r(14) 5 -.20, n.s. When computing these
correlations for explicit and implicit blocks separately, it was found
that frequencies and P3 correlated throughout for explicit feedback:
r(14) 5 -.49, p 5 .03, for f! F – r! F; -.34, p 5 .10, for r! F – f
! R; -.50, p 5 .03, for f! R – r! R. In contrast, for implicit feed-
back, only the first large difference between f! F and r ! F pro-
duced this correlation: r(14) 5 -.51, p 5 .02, for f! F – r! F; -.10,
n.s., for r! F – f! R; -.07, n.s., for f! R – r! R.
Discussion
P3 amplitudes were larger for incorrectly than correctly predicted
frequent stimuli. This influence of the preceding guess was inde-
pendent from explicitness of feedback, that is, from whether incor-
rectly and correctly predicted stimuli differed by their color or
Figure 6. Pz waveforms and scalp topographies of SPN for frequent and rare guesses in Experiment 2. Data have been pooled across frequent and
rare outcomes. Waveforms are displayed for frequent and rare guesses (thin vs. bold lines) with explicit versus implicit feedback (solid vs. dashed
lines). Unit of x axis is ms, with the zero point denoting outcome onset. Unit of y axis is mV, with negative polarity plotted upwards. The maps dis-
play scalp topographies at 100 ms before outcome onset (epoch depicted by gray rectangle). View on the head is from above. Each map is scaled
from negative maximum (black) to zero (white).
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were presented in black throughout. Thus, P3 evoked by these stim-
uli contained information about the preceding guess.
Throughout, independently from the preceding guess, P3s
evoked by frequent stimuli were larger with explicit color-provided
feedback than with implicit feedback. It must remain unclear
whether this effect was due to explicitness of feedback or due to
the physical saliency of color. Data from a recent study speak for
the latter alternative. In that study (Verleger, Baur, Metzner, &
Smigasiewicz, 2014), color and letter stimuli were used (though
not as feedback stimuli) and P3 amplitudes were globally increased
when color was the relevant feature compared to when letter iden-
tity was the relevant feature. In the present study, this global
increase of P3 by explicit color feedback did not occur for rare out-
comes. Probably, the rare letter identity was so salient that the addi-
tional variation of color was less intrusive.
General Discussion
Previous evidence from prediction tasks, when either the next stim-
ulus or its reward value had to be guessed, is inconsistent about
whether P3 amplitudes evoked by outcome stimuli are larger after
incorrect predictions (Hajcak et al., 2005, 2007; Sutton et al.,
1965), or after correct predictions (Bellebaum et al., 2010; Bismark
et al., 2013; Gentsch et al., 2013; Kimura & Katayama, 2013; Levit
et al., 1973; Wu & Zhou, 2009; Yang et al., 2013), or do not differ
between correct and incorrect predictions (Goyer et al., 2008;
Kotchoubey et al., 1997; Verleger & Cohen, 1978; Yeung & San-
fey, 2004). It was conjectured by Sutton et al. (1965) that the
effects of guess outcome on P3 depend on interactions with other
factors, one of them being the ratio of occurrence of the two out-
comes (Tueting et al., 1970). In the present study, we followed this
line. Indeed, a consistent effect of prediction on P3 amplitudes was
found for the frequent stimuli: P3 amplitudes were increased when
frequent stimuli were incorrectly predicted. A smaller and inverted
effect of prediction on P3 amplitudes was found for the rare stim-
uli: P3 amplitudes were increased when rare stimuli were correctly
predicted. These seemingly contradictory results may be reduced to
one regularity: Outcome-evoked P3 amplitudes were increased
when participants had chosen the rare prediction (leading to incor-
rectly predicted frequent stimuli and to correctly predicted rare
stimuli).
We expected additive effects of guess probability and stimulus
probability on P3 amplitudes. However, these two factors inter-
acted: Making the rare prediction had large effects on the small P3
evoked by frequent stimuli and small effects on the large P3
evoked by rare stimuli. This pattern of results appears like a ceiling
effect. Interestingly, it formally resembles the pattern reported by
Munson et al. (1984) who analyzed effects of predictions on
outcome-evoked P3 depending on which one of two equiprobable
stimuli had preceded. In that study, repetition of preceding stimuli
evoked a small P3, and alternations evoked a large P3. Formally
similar to our result, the small P3 evoked by repeating stimuli was
much increased when these stimuli were incorrectly predicted (as
with our frequent stimuli) and the large P3 evoked by stimulus
change was only little affected (as with our rare stimuli). Again,
this appears like a ceiling effect. A nearby interpretation of these
ceiling effects is that the process reflected by P3 was elicited in any
case by rare stimuli (in our study) or stimulus alternations (in Mun-
son et al.’s study) so could not be additionally increased by varia-
tions of the preceding guesses.
It may be suspected that the effects of guess frequency were
mediated by effects of payoff because frequency (80%/20%) was
confounded with payoff (2 ct./8 ct.). Increased payoff has been
found to increase P3 amplitudes in gambling tasks (Bellebaum
et al., 2010; Goyer et al., 2008; Yang et al., 2013; Yeung & Sanfey,
2004) though possibly moderated by other factors (Wu & Zhou,
2009). This suggestion leads to complex considerations, already for
the apparently uncontroversial effect of stimulus probability (larger
Figure 7. CPz waveforms and scalp topographies of P3 for each guess-outcome combination in Experiment 2. Waveforms are displayed in each of
the four combinations: f ! F (thin gray), r ! F (bold gray), f ! R (thin black), and r ! R (bold black), separately for explicit (solid) and implicit
(dotted) information about whether the guess was correct. Unit of x axis is ms, with the zero point denoting outcome onset. Unit of y axis is mV, with
negative polarity plotted upwards. The maps display scalp topographies at the time points of the P3 peaks (340 ms, 370 ms, 390 ms, 380 ms for f !
F, r ! F, f ! R, r ! R respectively, pooled across the explicit and implicit conditions). View on the head is from above. Each map is scaled from
minimum (black) to maximum (white).
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P3 after rare than frequent stimuli, R>F). At first sight, this
R>F effect may as well be due to, or amplified by, the larger
payoff with rare than frequent stimuli (8 ct. vs. 2 ct.). But, this
argument can only be made for correctly predicted stimuli.
Because there was no gain with incorrectly guessed stimuli, nor
was there a fine, the payoff was 0 ct. both for rare and fre-
quent stimuli when incorrectly predicted, whereas the R> F
amplitude effect also held for incorrectly predicted stimuli.
Thus, the main effect of stimulus probability cannot be easily
explained by the payoff variation between stimuli. However,
one may argue that what matters is not the payoff associated
with the stimuli but rather the discrepancy between expected
payoff and actual payoff. Thus, the payoff argument would
agree to the general idea that stimulus-evoked P3 reflects traces
of the guessing behavior. Several formulas might be proposed
how participants estimate the expected payoff and, consecu-
tively, the discrepancy between actual and expected payoff, tak-
ing into account how these expectancies are weighted by event
probabilities. The bottom line of this is that effects of payoff
can only be excluded by conducting new experiments where
other payoff arrangements are used or no payoff at all is asso-
ciated to the stimuli. We may note, though, that Tueting et al.
(1970) obtained effects of guess probability on P3 amplitudes
similar to the present ones, without any payoff associated to
successful guessing.
Therefore, we keep here to the notion that stimulus probabil-
ity and guessing probability both have effects on P3 amplitude,
with a ceiling effect for effects of guessing probability for rare
stimuli, presumably because the process reflected by P3 is
evoked by rare stimuli in any case. What can be the process
that is reflected by outcome-evoked P3? Recently, we have
stated the hypothesis that P3b reflects reactivation of inactive
established stimulus-response (S-R) links (Verleger, Baur et al.,
2014; Verleger, Metzner, Ouyang, Smigasiewicz, & Zhou 2014;
Verleger, Hamann, Asanowicz, & Smigasiewicz, 2015).1 This
hypothesis was derived from choice-response tasks, where such
S-R links might be “if X, press left,” “if U, press right.” When
X is frequent and U is rare, X-left will be active most of the
time, so U-right will have to be reactivated when U is per-
ceived, and this activation is the process reflected by P3b.
Applying this hypothesis to the guessing task meets with the
problem that outcome stimuli in guessing tasks do not require
any action, unlike the stimuli in choice-response tasks. Indeed,
actions do not seem essential for these P3s to be elicited:
Results did not dramatically differ from previously reported
ones when participants were required to respond to the unpre-
dictable stimuli, by pressing once more the associated key (Ver-
leger & Cohen, 1978). We have recently confirmed this result
in a comparison within subjects (unpublished data).
Can this S-R link hypothesis nevertheless be applied to
guessing tasks? Why are large P3 amplitudes evoked by out-
come stimuli even though no responses are required to these
outcomes? It may be argued that responses are actually
required to the outcome stimuli when participants play the
guessing-task game, namely, the internal responses “I was
right” or “I was wrong.” These responses being internal ones
("right" and "wrong") does not seem to be a principal differ-
ence from oddball tasks where internal counting of the rare
oddball stimuli has often been required as response. The effect
of the preceding guess on these internal responses may be due
to several factors. One possibility is that the frequent key press
is not made for guessing but just for continuing the task such
that participants are less interested in what the stimulus will
actually be. In contrast, when making the rare guess, partici-
pants might be much more interested in the outcome, and it
might be this increased level of interest that is responsible for
larger P3 amplitudes. In terms of S-R link hypothesis, the inter-
nal response right or wrong might not get much activated after
the more automatic frequent guess. What speaks against this
hypothesis is that there was little difference between fixed and
alternating key mapping in Experiment 1, although alternating
key mapping reduces the automaticity of making frequent
guesses to a large extent.
An alternative possibility is that the stimuli evoking these
internal responses are not the isolated outcomes but the combina-
tions of guesses and outcomes, to form event compounds.2 Thus,
the S-R links may be defined as (f! F, right), (r! F, wrong), (f
! R, wrong), (r ! R, right). By being evoked most of the time,
(f ! F, right) would need least reactivating and, thus, elicit the
smallest P3. By this account, the prediction task differs from
choice-response tasks by the fact that responses are required to
combinations of two successive events rather than to one event.
We are currently pursuing the question whether P3s evoked by the
outcomes in prediction tasks follow the same regularities as P3s
evoked by the second stimuli in choice response tasks in which
participants are to choose their responses by combining two suc-
cessive events.
There have not been many attempts to understand the proc-
essing reflected by outcome-evoked P3 in guessing tasks and
to integrate such understanding to what is known about P3
from other tasks, most notably the oddball task. In view of a
wealth of new findings, Sutton (1979) argued against the use
of unitary concepts like the concept of information transmis-
sion favored by him before. Of interest, Donchin’s (1981) con-
text updating hypothesis, primarily derived from oddball tasks,
was used to make the prediction in guessing tasks that P3
evoked by outcome stimuli would be related to participants’
choices in the trials following these outcomes. Some effects
were indeed found, although dependent on the preceding out-
comes (Munson et al., 1984) but this line of research has not
been pursued further. The present study aims at reviving such
attempts of a deeper understanding of what is the common
nature of the processes reflected by P3 in guessing tasks and
other tasks.
1. This hypothesis is compatible with conclusions drawn by Verleger
(1997) from his review on experimental effects on P3 latency and with
the major idea put forward in Verleger et al. (2005) that P3b forms a
bridge between S and R. It is certainly not compatible with Verleger’s
(1988) closure hypothesis, which states that P3b is evoked by expected
rather than by unexpected events. This early hypothesis had been explic-
itly withdrawn by Verleger (1998; cf. Verleger et al., 2005), mainly
because the closure idea neglected P3b’s close association to response
selection (cf. Verleger, 1997) and because its main prediction, that P3b
is evoked by expected rather than by unexpected events, conflicted with
several pieces of evidence, as convincingly summarized by Sommer,
Leuthold, and Matt (1998).
2. Thanks to Istvan Czigler who made this suggestion about event
compounds in an informal communication (Dortmund, May 7, 2014,
conference of the European Society for Cognitive and Affective
Neuroscience).
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